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Abstract 
Equity of access is a key policy objective in publicly-funded healthcare systems. Using data on 
patients undergoing non-emergency heart revascularization procedures in the English National 
Health Service, we find evidence of significant differences in waiting times within public hospitals 
between patients with different socioeconomic status (up to 35% difference between the most and 
least deprived population quintiles). We employ selection models to test whether such differences 
are explained by patients exercising choice over hospital or type of treatment. Selection bias due to 
choice has a limited effect on the gradient suggesting the presence of substantial inequities within 
the public system. 
 
Keywords: waiting times, inequalities, socioeconomic status, selection bias, choice. 
 
JEL codes: I14, I11, I18, C34. 
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1. Introduction 
Equity in access to healthcare is an important policy concern, especially in countries with a publicly 
funded health system. A substantial body of literature has provided empirical evidence about 
inequalities in the utilization of healthcare associated with socioeconomic status (SES), typically 
favouring richer patients (Van Doorslaer et al., 2000, Van Doorslaer et al., 2004). A more recent 
empirical literature suggests that pro-rich inequalities extend to timely access to planned (i.e. non-
emergency) healthcare.  
 
Many OECD countries provide universal access to healthcare ŝƌƌĞƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞŽĨƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ?ĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŽƉĂǇ ?
In these healthcare systems, access to publicly-funded services is not means tested and waiting 
times act as a rationing mechanism to clear supply and demand for planned healthcare (Martin and 
Smith, 1999). Patients demanding treatment are added to a waiting list and must wait before 
receiving treatment. Waiting times differ markedly across procedures and reach several months for 
common procedures like hip replacement or cataract surgery (Siciliani et al., 2013). Considerable 
attention is paid to waiting times in public sector management, as these are seen as benchmark 
indicators for both efficiency (Smith, 2002, Oliver, 2005) and satisfaction with public services (Cutler, 
2002). 
 
Rationing by waiting times may generate discontent amongst patients (Lindsay and Feigenbaum, 
1984, Propper, 1995, Siciliani and Hurst, 2005), as treatment benefits get postponed, suffering and 
uncertainty are prolonged, and the patienƚƐ ?ŚĞĂůƚŚƐƚĂƚƵƐŵĂǇĚĞƚĞƌŝŽƌĂƚĞǁŚŝůĞǁĂŝƚŝŶŐ(Appleby et 
al., 2005, Oudhoff et al., 2007). On the other hand, using waiting times instead of user fees to limit 
demand provides an advantage from an equity perspective as it grants access to healthcare services 
independently of ability to pay.  
 
Patients are commonly prioritized according to their medical need: more severely ill patients wait 
less, both for a given procedure and across procedures with different degrees of severity (Gravelle 
and Siciliani, 2008). However, patients with the same level of need are supposed to wait their turn 
ŽŶĂ “ĨŝƌƐƚ-come, first-ƐĞƌǀĞĚ ?ďĂƐŝƐ ?ŝƌƌĞƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞŽĨƚŚĞŝƌŝŶĐŽŵĞŽƌƐŽĐŝĂůƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ?This is meant to 
guarantee equity of access to treatment. 
 
Despite this strong equity notion, a recent empirical literature suggests that individuals with lower 
SES tend to wait longer within publicly-funded hospitals than those with higher SES in a range of 
OECD countries (reviewed in detail below). Inequalities within the same hospital occur for several 
reasons. It may be the result of patient selection, if individuals with different SES have different 
preferences regarding choice of hospital and medical treatment.  Individuals with higher SES may be 
more active and better organized in engaging with the health system, and more effective in 
expressing their needs. They could exploit their social networks to gain priority or be less likely to 
miss scheduled pre-treatment appointments with specialist doctors. Finally, inequalities may be due 
ƚŽƵŶĐŽŶƐĐŝŽƵƐďŝĂƐĂŶĚ “ƐƚĂƚŝƐƚŝĐĂůĚŝƐĐƌŝŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶ ?ďǇĚŽĐƚŽƌƐ(Van Ryn and Burke, 2000, Balsa and 
McGuire, 2001).
1
  
 
In this study we aim to shed some light on the causal mechanisms behind the SES differential in 
waiting times, by focusing on the first of these potential explanations. We estimate waiting time 
inequalities by SES arising within publicly-funded hospitals in England for patients in need of cardiac 
revascularization over the period 2002-2010.We then test whether part of the gradient can be 
                                                          
1
 We focus on inequalities within hospitals. Income-related inequalities can arise also across hospitals which may be due to 
differences in the volume of supply across areas with different socioeconomic composition, or differences in the quality of 
supply (Propper and Van Reenen, 2010). 
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explained by differences in patient choice and preferences with regard to the hospital of treatment 
and/or the type of medical procedure, and whether this has changed over time. 
  
The introduction or enhancement of patient choice in the healthcare sector has been undertaken by 
administrations in several industrialized countries, including Denmark, the Netherlands, Germany, 
Sweden and the USA (Thomson and Dixon, 2006), based on economic theory suggesting that 
freedom of choice in public services can motivate suppliers to increase service quality and prevent 
mismatch amongst consumers and suppliers (Hoxby, 2000, Le Grand, 2006). 
 
However, preferences driving healthcare choices are likely to be heterogeneous for patients 
belonging to different SES groups. More income-deprived patients might be less willing, or able to 
afford, to travel for planned care than less deprived patients. Moreover, prospective patients with 
different SES might have different risk and/or time preferences and face different constraints. 
Within cardiac revascularization interventions, angioplasty has both a lower perioperative mortality 
risk and shorter post-operative inpatient length of stay than coronary bypass surgery, but also a 
higher risk of subsequent cardiac or cerebrovascular events and need for revascularisation (Brener 
et al., 2004, Hannan et al., 2005, Griffin et al., 2007, Taggart, 2007). While for the majority of 
patients the type of treatment will be determined by their medical profile, for some patients there is 
uncertainty about the optimal treatment and different risk and time preferences may therefore 
ŵŽƚŝǀĂƚĞƐŽŵĞƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐƚŽ “ƐǁŝƚĐŚ ?ďĞƚǁĞĞŶƉƌŽĐĞĚƵƌĞƐ ? 
 
We include patient choice in our models allowing for a self-selection mechanism modelled with 
switching regimes. If individual preferences and constraints (e.g. ability to pay for transportation to 
hospitals located further away) do not play an important role in explaining the income-inequality 
gap in access to healthcare, then the gradient is more likely to represent unfair inequalities that are 
not justifiable. Such findings are important in the context of the English NHS, which has expended 
substantial monetary and non-monetary efforts during the period considered in our study to 
improve timely access to planned care (Department of Health, 2000).  
 
Our key findings are as follows. Patients living in more income-deprived (poorer) areas wait longer 
within a hospital for two common elective heart revascularization procedures, coronary artery 
bypass grafting (CABG) surgery and angioplasty (PCI, i.e. percutaneous coronary intervention). The 
estimated income-inequality gaps in waiting times are large. We find that in 2002 patients in need of 
CABG surgery in the least deprived quintile waited 35% less compared to the most deprived ones. 
The gradient gradually falls to 10% and 15% in 2010, respectively, following the general reductions in 
waiting times at system level. Most importantly we find that the gradient is not substantially altered 
ŽŶĐĞƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ?ĐŚŽŝĐĞŽǀĞƌŚŽƐƉŝƚĂůŽƌƚƌĞatment is taken into account. These findings are important 
for publicly-funded systems like the English NHS, which aims to prioritise access according to medical 
need regardless of economic status.  
 
The presence of waiting time inequality is consistent with previous studies. Cooper et al. (2009) find 
that people living in more affluent areas waited less than those in more deprived areas for cataract, 
hip and knee replacement surgery performed in the English NHS. Laudicella et al. (2012) focus on 
variations in waiting times within hospitals for hip replacement in 2001 in England, and find that 
patients living in areas with a higher proportion of educated individuals or more affluent were 
favoured in their waits. Both studies, like ours, rely on administrative NHS data that do not cover 
treatment of privately funded patients who are more likely to live in the most affluent areas. 
 
There is also evidence of inequalities from other countries with publicly-funded healthcare systems. 
Using administrative data from Norway, Monstad et al. (2014) find that richer men and more 
educated women tend to wait less for hip replacement within the same hospital. Kaarboe and 
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Carlsen (2014) find evidence of inequalities when waiting times are pooled across all surgical 
procedures. Sharma et al. (2013) find that patients living in areas with high SES wait on average 13% 
less for elective surgery than patients in areas associated with low SES, using data from the State of 
Victoria (Australia). Johar et al. (2013) find that patients with low SES wait on average 16 to 24% 
longer than people with high SES in New South Wales (Australia), after controlling for supply factors. 
Without controlling for hospital fixed effects, Alter et al. (1999) find that patients undergoing cardiac 
revascularisation in the highest income quintile group in Canada wait 45% less compared to patients 
in the lowest income quintile group, which could be explained by different availability of resources 
across hospitals.
2
 
 
We make a number of contributions to the existing literature. First, and most importantly, we 
explicitly allow for patients ? choices, thereby addressing possible self-selection bias in the gradient 
that could be due to bypassing the local hospital and/or choice of revascularization procedure. 
Arguably, inequalities in waiting times due to choice factors within the control of the patient are not 
 “ƵŶĨĂŝƌ ?and reflect personal preferences. We use a Roy model (Heckman, 2010) and present distinct 
models for two self-selection choices of bypassing the closest hospital and of choosing the 
procedure. 
 
Second, we focus on cardiac revascularization treatments where the risk of mortality, both while 
waiting and during the intervention, is not negligible. For this reason, inequalities in access to these 
procedures have been a key concern for English health policy-makers. This contrasts to previous 
studies that focus on procedures where mortality risk is negligible (such as cataract or hip 
replacement).
3
 Whether we should expect a larger gradient for revascularization is a priori 
ambiguous. On one hand, the management of the list may be more rigorous. On the other hand, 
ƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐŵĂǇďĞŵŽƌĞŝŵƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƚŽƵŶĚĞƌŐŽƚƌĞĂƚŵĞŶƚĂŶĚǁŝůůŝŶŐƚŽŝŶǀĞƐƚŵŽƌĞĞĨĨŽƌƚƚŽ “ƉůĂǇƚŚĞ
ƐǇƐƚĞŵ ?ƚŽŽďƚĂŝŶĂƐŚŽƌƚĞƌǁĂŝƚ ? 
 
Third, we investigate how inequalities have evolved over time. Among other things, we investigate 
whether income-related waiting time inequalities are more pronounced when waits are long.
4
 Given 
the current economic climate, this is of policy interest since waiting times have risen and are 
expected to further increase (Dorning and Blunt, 2015).  
 
The study is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces the institutional background. Section 3 
presents the econometric methods. Sections 4 and 5 describe respectively data and results. Section 
6 concludes.    
  
                                                          
2
 Of all these studies, only Monstad et al. (2014) use income information at individual patient level, while all the others use 
income measured at small area level as a proxy of SES.  
3
 An exception is Alter et al. (1999), who lump together the two procedures and focuses on inequalities across hospitals.  
4
 This goal is achieved in two ways. We report the evolution of the waiting time gradient in all the years of the sample, and 
so we measure the reduction in the gradient that is likely due to the waiting times policy enacted in 2003. We also employ 
yearly quantile regressions to assess the size of the gradient along the conditional distribution of hospital waiting times.  
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2. Institutional Setting 
During the years 2002 to 2010, the English NHS underwent a period of accelerated expenditure 
growth and substantial health system reforms. This was the result of a perception that the NHS had 
been  “ƵŶĚĞƌ-ĨƵŶĚĞĚ ?ĚƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞƉƌĞǀŝŽƵƐƚǁŽĚĞĐĂĚĞƐ ?ĂŶĚƋƵĂůŝƚǇǁĂƐƐƵĨĨĞƌŝŶŐĂƐĂƌĞƐƵůƚ (Moran, 
1999). A large investment plan was designed and implemented, leading to a 50% increase in the 
allocated budget and around a third increase in capacity over a five year period. This included 
funding for additional beds in existing hospitals, building of new hospitals and care centres, 
employment of additional doctors, nurses and supporting staff. However, this was also accompanied 
by a major programme of reforms.  
 
One of the most effective reforms was the implementation of centrally imposed waiting time targets 
with associated penalties for failure. This policy regime was explicitly aimed at reducing excessive 
waiting times for planned operations. The maximum waiting time for planned procedures was 
gradually reduced from 18 months to 12 months in 2003, 9 months in 2004 and 6 months in 2005. 
The maximum waiting time was further reduced in 2010 to 18 weeks from referral to treatment 
(NHS England, 2013).  The waiting time policy was a core part of a performance management 
strategy that required hospitals to meet targets to avoid the risk of either a senior-management 
change or take-over by a better performing hospital. These strong policy incentives contributed to 
the decline of waiting times for planned surgeries without measurable detriment to quality (Propper 
et al., 2008, 2010).  
 
In approximately the same period, a policy allowing patients to choose the hospital for planned 
treatment was introduced in the English NHS, with the aim of providing a competitive incentive for 
hospitals ƚŽŝŵƉƌŽǀĞƋƵĂůŝƚǇĂŶĚƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝǀĞŶĞƐƐƚŽĐŝƚŝǌĞŶƐ ?ŶĞĞĚƐ ?dŚŝƐƉŽůŝĐǇǁĂƐpart of a broader 
attempt to modernize the public sector by ĞŶŚĂŶĐŝŶŐ ĐŽŶƐƵŵĞƌƐ ? ĐŚŽŝĐĞ ? ďŽƚŚ ŝŶ h< ĂŶĚ ŽƚŚĞƌ
countries (Besley and Ghatak, 2003, Pawson et al., 2006, Musset, 2012, Vrangbaek et al., 2012). 
 
The hospital choice policy was rolled out in phases between 2006 and 2008.  However, for life-
threatening conditions, including those requiring revascularisation procedures such as CABG surgery 
and angioplasty (Department of Health, 2002), hospital choice was offered from July 2002. From that 
date, patients who had been waiting for more than six months were given the option to choose from 
a range of alternative providers.   
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3. Methods 
3.1 Baseline model without accounting for patient͛s choices 
We are interested in quantifying the extent of socioeconomic inequality in waiting time for NHS-
funded elective surgery within English NHS hospitals, and its evolution over time. Our data are 
repeated cross-sections of individuals receiving a given revascularization procedure, i.e. either CABG 
surgery or PCI. Our first econometric strategy uses a linear model with hospital fixed effects, 
estimated separately for each financial year and revascularization procedure.  
 
Define W  as the waiting time between the time the patient is added to the waiting list, after 
specialist assessment, and the time the patient is admitted to a hospital for treatment. The model is 
specified as:  
    1 2 3ij j ij ij ij ijw h y s xE E E Hc c c           (1) 
 
where  lnij ijw W  and ijW  is the waiting time of patient i in hospital j receiving the procedure in a 
given financial year. ijy  is a vector of dummy variables capturing socioeconomic status as measured 
by income deprivation of the area where the patients resides. We split the income deprivation 
distribution into five quintiles, with the highest indicating the least deprived areas (our reference 
category). 1E  is the vector of coefficients of interest. Income-related inequalities favouring the rich 
arise if the elements of 1E  are positive.  
 
The vector ijs  contains severity controls: age, gender, number of secondary diagnoses, number of 
hospital emergency admissions in the year preceding the procedure, and dummies for Charlson co-
morbidities (Charlson et al., 1987) ?dŚĞƐĞƉƌŽǆŝĞƐĐŽŶƚƌŽůĨŽƌƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ?ůĂƚĞŶƚŚĞĂůƚŚƐƚĂƚƵƐ ?ǁŚŝĐŚŝƐ
unknown to the econometrician but known to the doctor and/or the patient herself. Controlling for 
severity and comorbidity is important because these are legitimate reasons for higher priority on the 
waiting list which are also (negatively) correlated with income (Marmot et al., 1991, Smith, 1999, 
Wagstaff and Van Doorslaer, 2000). Omitting severity might result in a positive association between 
waiting times and SES, which disappears once severity is controlled for. Vector ijx  includes non-
severity variables such as month of admission.  
 
jh is a vector of hospital fixed effects. It controls for differences in waiting times across hospitals 
which may arise from: unobserved supply and demand factors, such as the number of beds, nurses, 
doctors, infrastructure, management and organization, and quality. This implies 1E  should be 
interpreted as waiting time inequalities arising within a hospital, as opposed to across hospitals.  
 
ijH is the idiosyncratic error. We estimate Equation (1) through OLS with Huber-White standard 
errors robust to unknown heteroscedasticity. We use the logarithmic transformation of the 
dependent variable, ijw , instead of its natural level ijW , to reduce the skewness of the waiting 
times distribution. We also provide estimates of the waiting time inequalities in the natural scale by 
employing a Duan smearing adjustment (Duan, 1983). 
 
Despite the hospital fixed effects and the extensive controls on severity, OLS estimation of Equation 
(1) may still potentially provide biased estimates of the income gradient 1E  in the presence of 
selection bias due to patient choice (Heckman, 1979).  
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We do not have information regarding insured patients opting out of the NHS who are treated by 
private sector hospitals. The private sector accounted for about 2.1% (6.8%) of planned CABG (PCI) 
interventions during the years 2008/2011 in England (Ludman, 2012, NICOR, 2012). However, we 
can assume that private treatments will be sought mainly by the wealthiest patients, living in the 
least income deprived areas. In this case, our estimates of the income-deprivation gradient on 
waiting times would be potentially downward biased. 
 
Our analysis controls for two sources of self-selection bias that are due to choice: hospital choice, i.e. 
patients may differ in the willingness to bypass the local hospital, and procedure choice, i.e. selecting 
into treatment (bypass versus angioplasty). We may expect more income-deprived individuals to be 
less willing to travel than less deprived ones, and therefore more likely to seek care in the closest 
hospital. These costs may increase non-linearly if more income-deprived patients are also 
unobservably sicker than less deprived ones. The reverse holds for less deprived patients, so there 
might be an upward bias in 1
ÖE  for low-income, less-mobile patients; and a downward bias in 1ÖE  for 
high-income, more mobile patients.  
 
Revascularization procedures have different risk profiles: both are effective, and while CABG carries 
a higher risk of short-term mortality it also exhibits better long-term survival rates and quality of life 
than PCI for patients older than 65 or with certain co-morbidities (The BARI investigators, 1996, 
2007, Hlatky et al., 2009, Taggart, 2009). We have proxies of patient health status and severity as 
control variables but cannot observe the exact patient pathology. Even if we knew the pathology, 
PCI and CABG might still be substitutes for prospective patients. Patient risk preferences might 
influence the choice of treatment, as might time preferences. The two procedures have different in-
hospital lengths of stay (two days for PCI as opposed to nine days for CABG), which implies different 
opportunity costs. If high-income patients are both less sick and have lower rates of time preference, 
they are more likely to undergo a CABG procedure, which may be perceived as imposing greater 
short-term risk, inconvenience and loss of time, but delivering greater long-run benefits to health 
and longevity. The opposite is true for low-income individuals, who may prefer PCI to minimize 
short-term risks and opportunity costs.  
 
ŽƚŚƐŽƵƌĐĞƐŽĨƐĞůĞĐƚŝŽŶďŝĂƐŵŝŐŚƚďĞŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĞĚĂƐ “ĨĂŝƌ ?ƐŽƵƌĐĞƐŽĨŝŶĞƋƵĂůŝƚŝĞƐĂŵŽŶŐƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ?
insofar as choice of treatment and hospital is considered a matter of individual responsibility rather 
than a barrier to access for which healthcare policy makers should be held to account.  
 
3.2 Endogenous switching regression models (Roy model) 
The choices of hospital bypassing and procedure can be addressed using self-selection models that 
ŝƐŽůĂƚĞƚŚĞ “ƵŶĨĂŝƌ ?ŝŶĞƋƵĂůŝƚǇŐƌĂĚŝĞŶƚĚƵĞƚŽŝŶĐŽŵĞĚĞƉƌŝǀĂƚŝŽŶ ?We estimate Roy models to deal 
with endogenous switching regimes (Roy, 1951, Heckman and Honore, 1990, Heckman, 2010) due to 
either hospital bypassing or choice of procedure. We model and estimate the two choices separately 
as we are interested in the marginal effect of each self-selection mechanism on the waiting time 
gradient.
5
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
5
 We provide estimates of a joint self-selection model for procedures and hospital location in Appendix C. 
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In the selection equation for hospital bypassing, we model self-selection of patients into closest 
versus not-closest hospitals (based on their area of residence). Define ijn  as a dummy equal to 1 if 
the patient bypasses the closest hospital and 0 otherwise. The Roy model for bypassing the closing 
hospital is defined by: 
 
 
  ^ `0 1 2 3
*
1 1,1 1 2,1 1 3,1 1 1
*
0 1,0 0 2,0 0 3,0 0 0
0 ,  0,1 ,
,  if 1,
,  if 0
ij ij ij ij ij ij ij
ijn ij j ij ij ij ij ij
ijn ij j ij ij ij ij ij
n I z y s x n
w w h y s x n
w w h y s x n
J J J J Q
E E E H
E E E H
­ c c c c     !  °° c c c       ®° c c c       °¯
    (2) 
where 1ijw  and 0ijw represent the observed log waiting times for patients selecting respectively into 
a further away hospital or into the closest one.  
 
The estimating equations of the Roy model accounting for self-selection into closest vs. not closest 
hospital for each procedure are:
 
 
 
   ^ `0 1 2 3 0 ,  0,1ij ij ij ij ij ij ijn I z y s x nJ J J J Qc c c c     !     (3)
^ `1 1 1 1 1,1 1 2,1 1 3,1 1 1 1Ö Ö| , , , , (  )ij j ij ij ij z j ij ij ij ij zw h y s x h y s xp pE E E E U Oc c c       (4) 
^ `0 0 0 0 1,0 0 2,0 0 3,0 0 0 0Ö Ö| , , , , (  )ij j ij ij ij z j ij ij ij ij zw h y s x h y s xp pE E E E U Oc c c        (5) 
 
 The unobserved error terms 0 1, ,Q H H  follow a degenerate trivariate Gaussian distribution, i.e.  
 
   0 1, , ~ 0, nTNQ H H :  ? ǁŝƚŚ ŵĞĂŶ ǌĞƌŽ ĂŶĚ ĐŽǀĂƌŝĂŶĐĞ ŵĂƚƌŝǆ ɏn, where 
2
0 1
2
0 0
2
1 1
n
Q H H
H H
H H
V V V
V V
V V
ª º« »:  « »« »¬ ¼
. 
The covariance between 1H  and 0H  is not defined, as 1w  and 0w  are never observed simultaneously. 
 
The patient self-selects into a given hospital, based on her utility, according to the selection Eq. (3). 
WĂƚŝĞŶƚ ?Ɛ ĐŚŽŝĐĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ Śospital is potentially driven by all factors affecting waiting times, i.e. 
severity, co-morbidities, other patient characteristics and income deprivation. We observe Eq. (4) 
when patients bypass the closest hospital and Eq. (5) when they opt for the closest hospital. 
 
The model can be identified through nonlinearities, but it is good practice to include at least one 
exclusion restriction variable (instrument) in the selection equation to avoid collinearity problems in 
the outcome equation (Newey, 1999). We follow McClellan et al. (1994) in the choice of the 
instrument ijz , which measures the difference in the distances between the first and second 
ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƌŽĨĐĂƌĞĨŽƌĂŐŝǀĞŶƉƌŽĐĞĚƵƌĞĨƌŽŵƚŚĞƉĂƚŝĞŶƚ ?Ɛarea of residence. The patient is expected 
to be more likely to choose the closest hospital if the alternative hospital is further away from her 
location. The differential distance between the first and second provider is a measure of the relative 
opportunity cost between hospital locations for a given procedure, hence it is a proper instrument 
for selection into the closest hospital. Patients with two hospitals at approximately the same 
distance from home will be marginally indifferent on travelling to one provider or another. It is 
unlikely that ijz  is endogenous for waiting times, or correlated with 1H  or 0H , as we can assume 
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hospital location to be independent from ƚŚĞƉĂƚŝĞŶƚ ?ƐĂƌĞĂŽĨƌĞƐŝĚĞŶĐĞ ?ĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶĂůŽŶĐŽŶƚƌŽůƐĨŽƌ
ijy , ijs and ijx .6  
 
We estimate model (2) in two steps (Brave and Walstrum, 2014). In the first step, we retrieve the 
propensity score p  (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983) from the estimation of a probit model for the 
selection equation. Based on the estimated propensity score ( Öp ), the selection correction terms for 
the two outcome equations are computed as > @11 Ö Ö Ö( ) ( ) 1z z zp p pO I ª º ) ¬ ¼  and 
> @10 Ö Ö Ö( ) ( )z z zp p pO I ª º  )¬ ¼ . In the second step, two separate equations for the waiting time 
outcomes are estimated, one for each regime of hospital choice (closest/not closest). Selection 
correction for the two conditional means is addressed by the terms 1 Ö( )pO and 0 Ö( )pO : there is a 
potential self-selection bias in the estimates when 1U and 0U  are significantly different from zero. 
Estimation is performed by OLS on the original covariates plus the selection correction term. 
Standard errors are bootstrapped to account for the two-step estimation process (Murphy and 
Topel, 2002).  
 
Including hospital fixed-effects jh  in the waiting times equations of the Roy model is critical. 
Hospital effects must be equal in the two regimes, because they represent supply or quality shifters 
that are valid for the same hospital, independently on the choice of the patient. Otherwise, we 
would be assuming different waiting time production functions for the same hospital, one for each 
regime of hospital bypassing. Hence we constrain the hospital level effects to be the same as those 
estimated by OLS in Eq. (1).
7
  
 
We estimate a similar Roy model for the choice between CABG surgery and PCI, with analogous 
specifications and distributional assumptions of the error terms. Here we use the difference 
between the average distance to the first three CABG hospitals and the average distance to first 
three PCI hospitals ĨƌŽŵƚŚĞƉĂƚŝĞŶƚ ?Ɛarea of residence as an exclusion restriction (variable ijc ). Let 
ijk be the indicator variable with value 1 if the patient undergoes a CABG surgery, and 0 if she opts 
for a PCI procedure. The estimating equations are  
 
    ^ `0 1 2 3 0 ,  0,1 ,ij ij ij ij ij ij ijk I m c m y m s m x k9c c c c     !      (6)
 ^ `1 1 1 1 1 1 1,1 1 2,1 1 3,1 1 1 1Ö  Ö| , , , , ( ) ij j ij ij ij c j ij ij ij ij cw h y s x h y s x pE p G G G U Oc c c        (7)
 ^ `0 0 0 0 0 0 1,0 0 2,0 0 3,0 0 0 0Ö  Ö| , , , , ( ) ij j ij ij ij c j ij ij ij ij cw h y s x h y s x pE p G G G U Oc c c       (8) 
 
with selection correction terms > @11 Ö Ö Ö( ) ( ) 1c c cp p pO I ª º ) ¬ ¼  and > @10 Ö Ö Ö( ) ( )c c cp p pO I ª º  )¬ ¼ .  
                                                          
6
 The differential distance coulĚ ďĞ ĞŶĚŽŐĞŶŽƵƐ ŝĨ ƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ? ĐŚŽŽƐĞ ƚŚĞŝƌ ůŽĐĂƚŝŽŶ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ ďĂƐŝƐ ŽĨ ŚŽƐƉŝƚĂů ůŽĐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?
Although this hypothesis cannot be ruled out a priori, it is unlikely to be the case for most of the population in England. 
Moreover, in our case residential sorting requires ex ante knowledge of the patients about the probability of needing 
cardiac revascularization treatment in the near future. 
7
 Hospital fixed effects are estimated from Eq. (1) and included in the estimation of Equations (4) and (5).  To address any 
concern of estimation bias, we ran an exploratory model where the hospital effects were constrained to be proportional to 
those obtained through OLS, but equal in the two arms of the selection model. Then we run a t-test on the fixed-effects 
coefficients in each year, testing if the estimated fixed effects coefficient shifter is equal to 1. The test is never rejected, 
suggesting that the constrained fixed-effects in the Roy model are statistically equivalent to the OLS fixed effects from Eq. 
(1).  
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Ceteris paribus ?ƚŚĞƉĂƚŝĞŶƚŝƐĂƐƐƵŵĞĚƚŽƐĞůĞĐƚƚŚĞƉƌŽĐĞĚƵƌĞǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ “ŚŝŐŚĞƐƚĂǀĂŝůĂďŝůŝƚǇ ?in her 
location. If hospitals providing CABG surgery are far away and PCI providers are on average closer to 
the patient, the patient is more likely to choose PCI to minimize her opportunity cost of travel. The 
set of English hospitals providing elective CABG surgery is substantially smaller compared to PCIs. 
While in 2002 the number of hospitals was similar (32 for CABG and 37 for PCI), by 2010 the number 
of hospitals offering PCIs had more than doubled (32 for CABG and 83 for PCI). For only about 30% of 
the patients in our sample the nearest three hospitals offer both PCI and CABG surgery, so there is 
substantial variation in our exclusion restriction variable. We allow for different hospital fixed-effects 
in the waiting time equations, 1jh and 0jh .  
 
3.3 Fixed effects quantile regressions 
We also provide estimates of a quantile regression model accounting for hospital fixed effects. 
Quantile regressions are useful to test how the gradient differs at different points of the waiting 
time distribution. Hospital fixed effects are introduced following the method proposed by Canay 
(2011). Provided that jkh  is a pure location shift of the conditional quantile function, the 
parameters of interest can be consistently identified by running a quantile regression of the 
difference between the individual outcome and the fixed effects ( ijn ijn jw w h  ) on the usual 
covariate set. The outcome Equation for the thW  conditional quantile ( QW ) is given by  
 
    1 1 1 1 1,1 1 2,1 1 3,1 1 1| , , ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )ij ij ij ij ij ij ij ijQ w y s x y s x QW WE W E W E W H Wc c c       (9) 
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4. Data 
We use data from the Hospital Episode Statistics (HES) for the nine financial years (April to March) 
2002/03 to 2010/11.
8
 HES is an administrative dataset containing records of all NHS-funded hospital 
admissions in England. The sample includes all elective patients admitted for CABG surgery or PCI. 
We exclude duplicates, incomplete admission records, or records with missing information on 
important covariates. Elective inpatient waiting time measures the total wait of the patient from the 
time she is added to the waiting list to when she is admitted to hospital to receive treatment. We 
ĞǆƚƌĂĐƚ ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ ŽŶ ƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ? ĂŐĞ ? ŐĞŶĚĞƌ ? ŵŽŶƚŚ ŽĨ ĂĚŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ ? ĂŶĚ ƐĞǀĞƌŝƚǇ ĐŽŶƚƌŽůƐ ƐƵĐŚ ĂƐ
number of secondary diagnoses, Charlson comorbidities and the number of past emergency 
admissions to hospitals in the year preceding the surgery. 
 
As a measure of income deprivation we use the income domain of the Economic Deprivation Index 
(EDI) (Gill, 2012). This index tracks levels of economic deprivation from 1999 to 2009 in small areas in 
England, called Lower-layer Super Output Areas (LSOAs). In the period 2002-2011, there were 32,482 
LSOAs, with an average population of around 1500 residents. EDI measures the proportion of people 
aged under 60 in an area who are living in low income households (more specifically, benefit units) 
that are claiming certain out-of-work means-tested social security benefits.
9
 It is also referred to as 
the income deprivation rate. EDI is comparable over the period considered since it takes account of 
changes to the tax and benefit systems over time. For this reason, using EDI to proxy income 
deprivation is preferable to the more commonly used Index of Multiple Deprivation. LSOAs are 
ranked according to the level of economic deprivation in each year. Our main regressors of interest 
are a set of dummy variables, corresponding to the five quintiles of the income deprivation 
distribution at LSOA level in each year of the sample. The first and fifth quintiles represent 
respectively the most and least income deprived LSOAs.
10
  
 
Straight-line distances between the patient LSOA of residence and all relevant hospitals in a given 
year are computed by matching HES data with hospital postcode information and geographic 
coordinates. The hospital choice sets for patients are computed separately by procedures, and then 
merged. We construct a binary indicator for bypassing the closest hospital, based on the actual 
procedure chosen.  
 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics on treated patients and average waiting times. Over the period 
considered, there have been more than 320,000 elective publicly-funded revascularization 
procedures. The number of PCIs was almost twice that of CABG surgeries at the end of the period, 
despite the level being quite similar in 2002. The drop in CABG procedures and the increase in PCIs 
indicate a plausible substitution effect over time.  
 
For both procedures waiting times have declined sharply in the last decade starting at 153 (90) days 
for CABG (PCI) in 2002 and falling to 50 (40) in 2010. Figure 1(a) and Figure 1(b) show the trend in 
the average waiting times for the two revascularization procedures between 2002 and 2010, i.e. the 
unconditional waiting times means by income deprivation category. Unconditional waiting times for 
CABG (PCI) fell sharply after 2003 (2004). For both procedures, in the starting years of the sample 
patients living in the most deprived LSOAs (Q1) waited longer than those patients living in the least 
deprived areas (Q5). While this is true for PCI patients in all the years of the sample, most income-
                                                          
8
 Hospital Episode Statistics are Copyright ® 2015, re-used with the permission of The Health & Social Care Information 
Centre. All rights reserved.  
9
 In particular, the means-tested benefits are Income Support (IS) or income-ďĂƐĞĚ :ŽďƐĞĞŬĞƌ ?Ɛ ůůŽǁĂŶĐĞ  ?:^-IB). For 
further details on the procedure and the index calculation, see McLennan et al. (2011). 
10
 In the regression analysis we consider the least income deprived quintile as the reference category. We estimate each 
model with a constant, hence the reference category gets omitted from the specifications. 
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deprived CABG patients seemed to receive a faster treatment than their least deprived counterparts 
from 2008 onwards.  
 
Table 1: Treated patients and average waiting times by year and procedure. 
Revascularization 
Procedures 
PCI (coronary angioplasty) CABG (coronary bypass) 
Years 
Patients  
Treated 
Average  
Wait (days) 
Patients  
Treated 
Average  
Wait (days) 
Whole sample 211,589 57.57  109,487 83.17  
2002 16,099 89.76  14,661 153.48  
2003 20,144 93.03  14,219 106.12  
2004 24,358 83.73  14,074 98.33  
2005 25,632 56.47  12,060 65.36  
2006 26,775 52.54  11,536 65.93  
2007 25,553 44.30  12,218 64.43  
2008 25,404 37.35  11,831 57.82  
2009 23,862 40.03  10,000 49.54  
2010 23,762 39.23  8,888 50.39  
 
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics of the patient sample. Both PCI and CABG patients are on 
average 64-65 years old. PCI patients have fewer comorbidities and more past emergency 
utilizations in the year preceding the intervention than CABG patients. Both procedures are spread 
similarly in terms of LSOA income deprivation and months of admission. 82% (74%) of CABG (PCI) 
patients are male. The average distance travelled to the chosen hospital is 32 (26) km for CABG (PCI) 
patients, being higher for CABG patients since fewer hospitals offer this procedure. More than 35% 
of patients bypass the local hospital.  
 
The exclusion restriction variables are based on distances and are reported at the bottom of the 
table. For patients who underwent CABG surgery, the average difference between the closest and 
second-closest hospital is 22km, although for a quarter of patients this distance exceeds 42.5km. 
Similarly, the mean differential distance for PCI patients is 16km and for 25% of patients it exceeds 
33km. Hospitals that provide CABG surgery are on average further away than those providing PCI 
services for all patients in our sample, although this difference is less pronounced for patients that 
underwent CABG surgery (11km vs 13km), i.e. CABG surgery was relatively more available to them.  
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Table 2: Sample descriptive statistics by procedure. 
  Mean PCI Mean CABG 
Waiting Times (in days) 57.57 83.17 
EDI Income - 1st Quintile (most deprived) 18.66% 19.13% 
EDI Income - 2nd Quintile 19.70% 20.09% 
EDI Income - 3rd Quintile 20.89% 20.89% 
EDI Income - 4th Quintile 20.92% 20.82% 
EDI Income - 5th Quintile 19.82% 19.07% 
Patient bypasses the closest hospital 38.61% 35.96% 
Number of diagnosis 4.37 5.72 
Past emergency utilization past 365 days 0.37 0.28 
Patient age 64.09 65.33 
Patient is female 25.85% 18.09% 
ŝƐƚĂŶĐĞďĞƚǁĞĞŶƉĂƚŝĞŶƚ ?Ɛ>^KƚŽĐŚŽƐĞŶŚŽƐƉŝƚĂů ?Ŭŵ ? 24.53 32.41 
Congestive Heart Failure 2.45% 7.09% 
Peripheral Vascular Disease 4.16% 7.36% 
Cerebrovascular Disease 0.63% 2.74% 
Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease 7.01% 8.55% 
Rheumatoid Disease 0.86% 0.99% 
Peptic Ulcer Disease 0.17% 0.43% 
Mild Liver Disease 0.16% 0.19% 
Diabetes 16.76% 20.76% 
Diabetes & Complications 0.59% 0.98% 
Renal Disease 2.52% 3.48% 
Cancer 0.73% 0.82% 
Admission Month: January 8.31% 8.53% 
Admission Month: February 8.48% 8.06% 
Admission Month: March 9.19% 8.62% 
Admission Month: April 7.79% 8.14% 
Admission Month: May 7.76% 8.26% 
Admission Month: June 8.74% 8.92% 
Admission Month: July 8.80% 8.79% 
Admission Month: August 7.96% 8.50% 
Admission Month: September 8.54% 8.72% 
Admission Month: October 8.67% 8.72% 
Admission Month: November 9.01% 8.52% 
Admission Month: December 6.75% 6.23% 
Distance difference:  2nd minus 1st closest hospital (CABG) 
 
22.15 
Distance difference : 2nd minus 1st closest hospital (PCI) 16.07
 Difference in mean hospitals distances: 3 closest CABG minus 3 closest PCI 12.92 10.80
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Figure 1: Actual and estimated absolute and percentage income-related inequalities in waiting times over 
years 2002/2010.
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5. Results 
5.1 OLS with Hospital Fixed Effects  
Table 3 and Table 4 show the effect of income deprivation on waiting time for CABG and PCI patients 
respectively. The inequality gradient is statistically significant at 1% level for the two most deprived 
income quintiles in each year for PCI and for most years for CABG.  
 
We plot the conditional waiting time in days, after applying a Duan smearing adjustment, in Figure 1 
(c) and Figure 2 (d). The figures show that in 2002, CABG patients who were most income deprived 
waited 35% longer than least income deprived ones, as measured on the natural scale (see Figure 1 
(e)). The effect reduced over time, but remained between 18% and 8% in all years after 2005. The 
quantitative effect is larger for patients who underwent PCI. In 2002, patients who were most 
income deprived waited 52% longer than the least income-deprived patients (see Figure 1 (f)). The 
gap remains above 18% in all years up to 2007 and above 10% after 2007.  
 
Controlling for other variables, the difference in waiting times between the most and least deprived 
patients was 43 days for CABG and 24 days for PCI in 2002. By 2010, it was five days for both 
procedures.  
 
All case-mix variables showed the expected sign and were statistically significant in most 
specifications. For example, the effect of past emergency utilizations on waiting time is negative and 
significant at 1%, which is consistent with patient prioritisation on the basis of health status.  
 
5.2 Switching regression with choice of bypassing the closest hospital  
Tables 5 and 6 show the effect of income deprivation on waiting times accounting for self-selection 
due to bypassing the closest hospital.
11
 CABG and PCI patients are analysed separately. In almost 
every year, the selection correction term is statistically significant, providing evidence of self-
selection. In both procedure sub-samples, the first stage probit suggests that least income-deprived 
patients are more mobile and incline to travel farther, bypassing the closest hospitals, while the 
opposite is true for the patients in most income-deprived areas.  
 
Until 2006/7, the income inequality gradient for patients bypassing local hospitals is less pronounced 
than for those treated at the closest hospital for both procedures. The most income deprived CABG 
(PCI) patients admitted to the closest hospital waited around 37% (43%) in 2002 and 17% (18%) in 
2010 longer compared to the least income deprived ones. The most deprived patients CABG (PCI) 
patients bypassing the closest hospital waited instead 17% (40%) in 2002 and 14% (14%) in 2010 
longer compared to the least income deprived ones. From 2008/9 onwards the gradient tends to 
fade away in size and is not always statistically significant for CABG patients, while it remains 
statistically significant for PCI patients.    
 
The first stage regression shows that a higher differential distance between the closest and second 
closest provider (our exclusion restriction) implies a lower probability of bypassing the local hospital 
and it is always statistically significant at the 1% level for both procedures.  
 
                                                          
11
 We also formally test for the hypothesis of switching regimes by revascularization procedure and by choice of closest 
hospital bypassing, through a Chow test (Chow, 1960); and for the common support of the propensity score across self-
selection arms, via histograms. Results are reported in Appendices A and B and confirm both the switching regimes 
hypothesis and the presence of a substantial common support for the propensity score.  
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Table 3: Effect of income deprivation (quintiles of yearly income deprivation distribution) on CABG waiting times. 
 Notes. Controls: Age, age bands dummies, admission month, Charlson comorbidities dummies, gender, number of secondary diagnoses, past emergency utilization, hospital fixed effects.  * 
p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01   
 
 
 
Table 4: Effect of income deprivation (quintiles of yearly income deprivation distribution) on PCI waiting times. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
EDI income 1st quintile 
(most deprived) 
0.4231*** 0.3164*** 0.2306*** 0.1637*** 0.1688*** 0.1667*** 0.1098*** 0.1217*** 0.1381*** 
EDI income 2nd quintile 0.3402*** 0.2654*** 0.1980*** 0.1581*** 0.1638*** 0.1204*** 0.0954*** 0.1186*** 0.1193*** 
EDI income 3rd quintile 0.2402*** 0.1569*** 0.1102*** 0.1164*** 0.1171*** 0.0924*** 0.0986*** 0.0887*** 0.0966*** 
EDI income 4th quintile 0.1078*** 0.0931*** 0.0487** 0.0361* 0.0667*** 0.0667*** 0.0520*** 0.0539** 0.0490** 
Constant 3.7968*** 3.9128*** 3.9489*** 3.5820*** 3.5585*** 3.2195*** 3.2286*** 3.1844*** 3.2231*** 
          
Patients 16095 20140 24355 25632 26772 25545 25399 23861 23759 
Hospital Sites 37 42 44 52 60 66 73 76 83 
R^2 0.13 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.10 0.15 0.16 0.18 0.16 
Notes. Controls: Age, age bands dummies, admission month, Charlson comorbidities dummies, gender, number of secondary diagnoses, past emergency utilization, hospital fixed effects.  * 
p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01   
 
  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
EDI income 1st quintile 
(most deprived) 
0.2942*** 0.2333*** 0.1681*** 0.1346*** 0.1627*** 0.1260*** 0.0702** 0.0779*** 0.0921** 
EDI income 2nd quintile 0.2092*** 0.1871*** 0.1013*** 0.1150*** 0.1451*** 0.1623*** 0.0656** 0.0819*** 0.0935** 
EDI income 3rd quintile 0.1529*** 0.0903** 0.1341*** 0.0983*** 0.0834** 0.0724*** 0.0485* 0.0270 0.0648* 
EDI income 4th quintile 0.0221 0.0582* 0.0528** 0.0628** 0.0343 0.0947*** 0.0279 0.0081 0.0326 
Constant 4.2215*** 4.0960*** 4.0651*** 3.6726*** 3.7363*** 3.6791*** 3.6018*** 3.4662*** 3.4424*** 
          
Patients 14654 14213 14074 12060 11536 12218 11829 10000 8888 
Hospital Sites 32 35 34 32 32 33 34 32 32 
R^2 0.19 0.19 0.12 0.13 0.17 0.22 0.17 0.17 0.15 
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Table 5:  Roy model: Income inequalities in CABG waiting times, accounting for selection of hospital distance. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
 Patients not choosing the closest CABG hospital site  ? Equation (4) 
EDI income 1st quintile  0.1671*** 0.2229*** 0.2274*** 0.0818* 0.1429*** 0.1636*** 0.0153 0.0976** 0.0660 
EDI income 2nd quintile 0.1086** 0.1947*** 0.0856* 0.0797* 0.1353*** 0.1760*** 0.0150 0.1095** 0.1583*** 
EDI income 3rd quintile 0.0474 0.0807* 0.1564*** 0.0716* 0.0690 0.1062*** 0.0421 0.0724 0.0227 
EDI income 4th quintile -0.0035 0.0691 0.0381 0.0272 0.0104 0.1395*** 0.0076 0.0265 0.0484 
IMR1 - Not closest 0.1277** 0.1970*** 0.2664*** 0.0086 -0.0465 0.0187 0.1122** 0.0505 -0.0653 
Constant 4.3941*** 4.1392*** 4.3827*** 3.7694*** 3.7312*** 3.6206*** 3.6255*** 3.6014*** 3.3693*** 
 Patients choosing the closest CABG hospital site  ? Equation (5) 
EDI income 1st quintile  0.3666*** 0.2527*** 0.1469*** 0.1687*** 0.1762*** 0.1089*** 0.1114*** 0.0692** 0.1020*** 
EDI income 2nd quintile 0.2711*** 0.1846*** 0.1166*** 0.1405*** 0.1523*** 0.1535*** 0.0985*** 0.0708** 0.0608* 
EDI income 3rd quintile 0.2172*** 0.1045*** 0.1287*** 0.1172*** 0.0933*** 0.0514* 0.0689** 0.0057 0.0847** 
EDI income 4th quintile 0.0427 0.0577 0.0690** 0.0883*** 0.0513 0.0693** 0.0433 -0.0009 0.0265 
IMR0 - Closest -0.0174 -0.0091 -0.0988** -0.0172 0.0281 -0.0234 0.0522 0.0014 0.0719** 
Constant 4.1892*** 4.1937*** 4.0696*** 3.6239*** 3.7021*** 3.7343*** 3.6118*** 3.4253*** 3.4176*** 
 1
st
 Stage Probit for Choice of provider by distance: CLOSEST vs NOT CLOSEST hospital - only CABG  ? Equation (3) 
Distance difference 2nd - 1st 
provider 
-0.0339*** -0.0184*** -0.0182*** -0.0316*** -0.0366*** -0.0282*** -0.0318*** -0.0329*** -0.0380*** 
EDI income 1st quintile  -0.1832*** -0.2132*** -0.2065*** -0.2825*** -0.3233*** -0.2321*** -0.2405*** -0.1738*** -0.1348*** 
EDI income 2nd quintile -0.0185 -0.0361 -0.0186 -0.0800** -0.0185 -0.0854** -0.0165 -0.0561 -0.0017 
EDI income 3rd quintile -0.0233 -0.0503 -0.0229 -0.0110 -0.0868** -0.0273 -0.0725* 0.0130 0.0187 
EDI income 4th quintile -0.0265 -0.0171 -0.0426 -0.0313 -0.0706* -0.0546 0.0397 0.0268 0.0591 
Constant 0.2726*** 0.1231** 0.0626 0.2071*** 0.2775*** 0.1454** 0.1883*** 0.1853*** 0.2735*** 
          
Patients 14654 14213 14074 12060 11536 12218 11829 10000 8888 
Chi-squared p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Pseudo R^2 0.14 0.08 0.09 0.15 0.18 0.13 0.15 0.14 0.18 
Notes. Roy model on CABG sample based on Model (2). Exclusion restriction in the 1
st
 stage regression: differential distance between second and first CABG hospital site. Controls: Age, age 
bands dummies, admission month, Charlson comorbidities dummies, Gender, Number of diagnosis, Emergency Past utilization previous year, hospital fixed effects (except for 1
st
 stage probit 
choice). IMR = Parametric selection correction (Inverse Mills Ratio). * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table 6: Roy model: Income inequalities in PCI waiting times, accounting for selection of hospital distance. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Patients not choosing the closest PCI hospital site  ? Equation (4) 
EDI income 1st quintile 0.4043*** 0.2845*** 0.1846*** 0.1478*** 0.1422*** 0.2120*** 0.1269*** 0.1496*** 0.1425*** 
EDI income 2nd quintile 0.3251*** 0.2956*** 0.1930*** 0.1516*** 0.1340*** 0.1537*** 0.1314*** 0.1612*** 0.1119*** 
EDI income 3rd quintile 0.2375*** 0.1595*** 0.0912*** 0.1169*** 0.0881*** 0.1424*** 0.1174*** 0.1277*** 0.0824*** 
EDI income 4th quintile 0.0710 0.0890** 0.0013 0.0474* 0.0645** 0.1115*** 0.0717*** 0.0980*** 0.0771*** 
IMR1 - Not Closest -0.1001** -0.0272 -0.0386 -0.0018 -0.0648** -0.0106 -0.0575** 0.0263 -0.0054 
Constant 3.5600*** 3.8989*** 3.8665*** 3.5116*** 3.4935*** 3.1513*** 3.1757*** 3.2392*** 3.2156*** 
Patients choosing the closest PCI hospital site  ? Equation (5) 
EDI income 1st quintile  0.4344*** 0.3219*** 0.2493*** 0.1747*** 0.1841*** 0.1363*** 0.1004*** 0.1090*** 0.1374*** 
EDI income 2nd quintile 0.3447*** 0.2394*** 0.1992*** 0.1634*** 0.1868*** 0.0966*** 0.0735*** 0.0946*** 0.1228*** 
EDI income 3rd quintile 0.2412*** 0.1471*** 0.1204*** 0.1171*** 0.1362*** 0.0537** 0.0855*** 0.0689*** 0.1061*** 
EDI income 4th quintile 0.1292*** 0.0909*** 0.0735*** 0.0292 0.0654*** 0.0333 0.0400* 0.0301 0.0336 
IMR0 - Closest 0.1104*** 0.0279 -0.0073 -0.0035 -0.0267 -0.0093 -0.0102 0.0286 0.0037 
Constant 3.8188*** 3.9022*** 3.9710*** 3.6293*** 3.5824*** 3.2653*** 3.2319*** 3.1540*** 3.2218*** 
  1
st
 Stage Probit for Choice of provider by distance: CLOSEST vs NOT CLOSEST hospital - only PCI  ? Equation (3) 
Distance difference 2nd - 1st provider -0.0342*** -0.0419*** -0.0385*** -0.0408*** -0.0174*** -0.0224*** -0.0302*** -0.0422*** -0.0423*** 
EDI income 1st quintile -0.3843*** -0.3981*** -0.3217*** -0.2464*** -0.1281*** -0.0521** -0.0282 -0.1350*** -0.1433*** 
EDI income 2nd quintile -0.1111*** -0.1223*** -0.0101 -0.0190 -0.0220 0.0588** 0.0614** -0.0193 -0.0569** 
EDI income 3rd quintile -0.0792** -0.0775** -0.0409 -0.0400 0.0102 0.0317 0.0642** 0.0313 0.0308 
EDI income 4th quintile -0.0871*** -0.0644** -0.0442 -0.0030 -0.0008 -0.0036 0.1045*** 0.0278 0.0270 
Constant 0.2822*** 0.3393*** 0.2140*** 0.3757*** 0.0823** 0.1052*** 0.0909** 0.0974** 0.1691*** 
          
Patients 16095 20140 24355 25632 26772 25545 25399 23861 23759 
Chi-squared p-value 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Pseudo R^2 0.14 0.18 0.16 0.16 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.1 0.09 
Notes. Roy model on PCI sample based on Model (2). Exclusion restriction in the 1
st
 stage regression: differential distance between second and first PCI hospital site. Controls: Age, age bands 
dummies, admission month, Charlson comorbidities dummies, Gender, Number of diagnosis, Emergency Past utilization previous year, hospital fixed effects (except for 1
st
 stage probit 
choice). IMR = Parametric selection correction (Inverse Mills Ratio). * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Figure 2: Estimated CABG waiting times by chosen hospital location and deprivation quintile  
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Figure 3: Estimated PCI waiting times by chosen hospital location and deprivation quintile  
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Overall, the second stage regressions confirm the presence of a significant (both quantitatively and 
statistically) socioeconomic gradient in waiting times. Not surprisingly, the magnitude of the OLS 
gradient is an average of the estimated gradients of the switching regression model.  
 
Figure 2 and Figure 3 show the plots of the conditional estimates from the Roy model with choice of 
bypassing the closest hospital after being retransformed on the raw scale with a Duan smearing 
adjustment.  
 
The estimates plotted in the graphs confirm the OLS results on the presence of the gradient. 
Substantial income-related inequalities in waiting times between patients living in the most and the 
least deprived areas persist even allowing for choice. However, the decision to bypass the closest 
hospital pays off, for patients of both procedures in each year. The inequality gap is smaller for CABG 
patients who travel farther. In 2002/03 (2010/11) the gap for most deprived CABG patients 
bypassing the closest hospital was equal to 18% (7%), and 44% (11%) for patients treated at the 
closest provider. Not only did inequalities decline together with average waiting times, but choice 
might have been beneficial, at least in partially reducing the gap in healthcare access between the 
most and least deprived. This is especially true for CABG patients, having a very limited number of 
providers to be treated at. 
 
Bypassing the closest provider was beneficial only in the early years for PCI most deprived patients. 
In 2002/03 (2010/11) the percentage gap for PCI most deprived patients bypassing the closest 
hospital was equal to 50% (15%), compared to 54% (15%) for patients treated at the closest 
provider. The different dynamics for the gap of PCI patients might be due to the large increase in the 
number of PCI providers, which almost doubled during the period. The increase in PCI suppliers and 
supply has likely reduced the number of patients bypassing the closest hospital in search of more 
favourable waiting times.   
 
5.3 Switching regressions with choice of procedure 
Table 7 shows the effect of income deprivation on waiting times accounting for self-selection into 
procedure. The first stage probit suggests that no significant preference in the choice of 
revascularization procedure is due to the income deprivation status. This is reassuring, as in an 
equitable healthcare system the choice between procedures is granted fairly to patients of any 
socioeconomic background. The selection correction terms are significant at 5% levels in just five of 
the nine years. In line with simpler OLS models, results indicate larger income-related inequalities in 
waiting times for PCI than for CABG surgery. Compared to the OLS results, the quantitative effect of 
the gradient is generally unchanged when self-selection into treatment is taken into account, with 
the exception of the estimates for 2002. 
 
The coefficient of the exclusion restriction variable is negative and significant at 1% level in five of 
the nine years analysed. As expected, a larger differential distance to CABG provider reduces the 
probability of choosing CABG surgery. 
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Table 7: Roy model. Income inequalities in waiting times on CABG and PCI samples, accounting for selection of procedure. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Patients choosing CABG  ? Equation (7) 
EDI income 1st quintile  0.3605*** 0.2238*** 0.1614*** 0.1319*** 0.1544*** 0.1260*** 0.0695*** 0.0783*** 0.0927*** 
EDI income 2nd quintile 0.2557*** 0.1711*** 0.1028*** 0.1107*** 0.1425*** 0.1623*** 0.0708*** 0.0809*** 0.0925*** 
EDI income 3rd quintile 0.1868*** 0.0894*** 0.1423*** 0.0959*** 0.0878*** 0.0724*** 0.0481* 0.0267 0.0679** 
EDI income 4th quintile 0.0450 0.0685** 0.0602** 0.0578** 0.0336 0.0947*** 0.0225 0.0080 0.0300 
IMR1 - CABG -0.5930** 0.7736** 0.5971** 0.1162 0.3761 -0.0025 -0.2828 0.1087 0.1413 
Constant 3.9205*** 4.7000*** 4.2609*** 3.8637*** 4.2500*** 3.9414*** 3.0829*** 3.2087*** 3.3728*** 
Patients choosing PCI  ? Equation (8) 
EDI income 1st quintile  0.5063*** 0.3105*** 0.2323*** 0.1661*** 0.1688*** 0.1670*** 0.1093*** 0.1189*** 0.1364*** 
EDI income 2nd quintile 0.3974*** 0.2556*** 0.1977*** 0.1622*** 0.1638*** 0.1193*** 0.0988*** 0.1215*** 0.1214*** 
EDI income 3rd quintile 0.2819*** 0.1568*** 0.1083*** 0.1189*** 0.1171*** 0.0903*** 0.0985*** 0.0898*** 0.0906*** 
EDI income 4th quintile 0.1365*** 0.0998*** 0.0469** 0.0406** 0.0667*** 0.0672*** 0.0486*** 0.0547*** 0.0541*** 
IMR0 - PCI -0.7795* 0.5696 -0.1959 -0.1536 0.0035 0.1766 -0.2522 -0.5481*** -0.4976*** 
Constant 4.2005*** 3.5923*** 4.1968*** 3.6976*** 3.5055*** 3.0236*** 3.5466*** 3.4960*** 3.4379*** 
1
st
 Stage Probit for Choice of procedure: CABG vs PCI  ? Equation (6) 
Differential distance of first 3 
hospitals by procedure 
-0.0016*** 0.0001 -0.0013*** -0.0008** -0.0004 0.0009*** -0.0003 -0.0008** -0.0020*** 
EDI income 1st quintile 0.1810*** 0.0191 0.0173 0.0338 0.0295 -0.0008 -0.0030 -0.0087 -0.0053 
EDI income 2nd quintile 0.1254*** 0.0314 -0.0024 0.0543** 0.0077 0.0148 0.0281 0.0139 0.0104 
EDI income 3rd quintile 0.0909*** 0.0016 -0.0176 0.0314 -0.0171 0.0252 -0.0014 0.0039 -0.0300 
EDI income 4th quintile 0.0636*** -0.0210 -0.0177 0.0612*** 0.0017 -0.0050 -0.0284 0.0013 0.0282 
Constant -0.0714** -0.1671*** -0.3132*** -0.4841*** -0.4246*** -0.2987*** -0.3746*** -0.4634*** -0.5697*** 
          
Patients 30749 34353 38429 37692 38308 37763 37228 33861 32647 
Chi2_pval 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Pseudo R^2 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.10 0.10 0.13 
Notes. Roy model on joint CABG and PCI samples. Exclusion restriction in the 1
st
 stage regression: (average) distance between the first three hospitals providing CABG and the first three ones 
providing PCI. Controls: Age, age bands dummies, admission month, Charlson comorbidities dummies, Gender, Number of diagnosis, Emergency Past utilization previous year, hospital fixed 
effects (except for 1
st
 stage probit choice). IMR = Parametric selection correction (Inverse Mills Ratio). * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01    
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5.4 Quantile regressions with hospital fixed effects 
Table 8 and Table 9  report the effect of income deprivation on waiting times at different quantiles 
(10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th) of the conditional waiting time distribution. Income-related 
inequalities affected the entire waiting time distribution and were not confined to hospital with 
either relatively short or long waiting times. 
 
We plot the conditional waiting time in days, after applying a Duan smearing adjustment, in Figure 1 
(b) and Figure 1 (e). The figures show that in 2002, CABG patients who were most income deprived 
waited 35% longer than least income deprived ones, as measured on the natural scale (see Figure 1 
(c)). The effect reduced over time, but remained between 18% and 8% in all years after 2005. The 
quantitative effect is larger for patients who underwent PCI. In 2002, patients who were most 
income deprived waited 52% longer than the least income-deprived patients (see Figure 1 (f)). The 
gap remains above 18% in all years up to 2007 and above 10% after 2007. 
 
In the PCI sample, the dynamics are somewhat different. The gradient is still decreasing in time and 
it reduces as the conditional waiting time increases. But the gradient remains significant at shorter 
waits, and it completely fades away at longer waits. This could be evidence of a  “selection into 
treatment ? effect: wealthier patients might choose PCI instead of CABG as long as they are treated 
promptly. When they are not given sufficiently short waiting times (below 90th quantile), they have 
weaker incentives to insist on shorter wait and might switch to CABG, which offers longer-lasting 
health benefits.  
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Table 8: Quantile Regression with hospital fixed effects (Equation (9)). Income inequalities in waiting times. CABG patients.   
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
    2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Q10 
EDI income 1st quintile  0.4781*** 0.3623*** 0.1852** 0.2308*** 0.1857** 0.2108** 0.1797** 0.1173* 0.1224 
EDI income 2nd quintile 0.3441*** 0.2063** 0.1333 0.3140*** 0.2455** 0.3423*** 0.1507* 0.1380* 0.0968 
EDI income 3rd quintile 0.1438 0.1042 0.3044*** 0.2311*** 0.1746* 0.2012** 0.1857** 0.0525 0.0831 
EDI income 4th quintile 0.0392 0.0204 0.0742 0.1675** 0.0227 0.2250*** 0.1355* 0.1347** 0.0665 
Constant 2.6351*** 2.7324*** 2.4530*** 2.2791*** 2.4700*** 2.5190*** 2.5164*** 2.2392*** 2.1420*** 
Q25 
EDI income 1st quintile  0.4076*** 0.2912*** 0.2459*** 0.1217*** 0.1500*** 0.1073** 0.1029** 0.0274 0.0860* 
EDI income 2nd quintile 0.2803*** 0.2719*** 0.1611*** 0.1403*** 0.1658*** 0.2006*** 0.0201 0.0964** 0.0801* 
EDI income 3rd quintile 0.2522*** 0.1281** 0.2197*** 0.1473*** 0.1407*** 0.0958** 0.0925** 0.0676 0.1162*** 
EDI income 4th quintile 0.0645 0.1213** 0.1196** 0.1193** 0.0463 0.1552*** 0.0445 0.0054 0.0747* 
Constant 3.6949*** 3.6300*** 3.6097*** 3.3185*** 3.4895*** 3.4133*** 3.2577*** 3.0262*** 2.9401*** 
Q50 
EDI income 1st quintile  0.3345*** 0.1708*** 0.1266*** 0.0981*** 0.0909*** 0.0547*** 0.0417* 0.0500* 0.0348 
EDI income 2nd quintile 0.2652*** 0.1521*** 0.0754** 0.0649*** 0.0902*** 0.0586*** 0.0473** 0.0400 0.0556* 
EDI income 3rd quintile 0.1997*** 0.0900*** 0.0758*** 0.0503*** 0.0537*** 0.0145 0.0157 0.0177 0.0717** 
EDI income 4th quintile 0.0776** 0.0831*** 0.0688*** 0.0220 0.0123 0.0097 0.0121 -0.0058 0.0449 
Constant 4.4834*** 4.2945*** 4.3179*** 3.9716*** 3.9942*** 3.8896*** 3.7613*** 3.6483*** 3.6208*** 
Q75 
EDI income 1st quintile  0.1666*** 0.1572*** 0.1038*** 0.1110*** 0.0733*** 0.0914*** 0.0478** 0.0699*** 0.0611** 
EDI income 2nd quintile 0.1154*** 0.1267*** 0.0583*** 0.0722*** 0.0678*** 0.0676*** 0.0580*** 0.0713*** 0.0764*** 
EDI income 3rd quintile 0.0943*** 0.0758*** 0.0417** 0.0536*** 0.0123 0.0025 -0.0035 -0.0064 0.0165 
EDI income 4th quintile 0.0158 0.0513** 0.0130 0.0115 0.0007 0.0188 0.0009 -0.0169 0.0206 
Constant 5.0263*** 4.7974*** 4.8169*** 4.2386*** 4.2504*** 4.2022*** 4.1475*** 4.1075*** 4.0677*** 
Q90 
EDI income 1st quintile  0.1246*** 0.1572*** 0.1269*** 0.2071*** 0.1492*** 0.1270*** 0.0634** 0.1068*** 0.0931** 
EDI income 2nd quintile 0.0673** 0.0826*** 0.0832*** 0.0963*** 0.0672** 0.1195*** 0.0547** 0.0808*** 0.0730** 
EDI income 3rd quintile 0.0729*** 0.0235 0.0261 0.1418*** 0.0097 0.0181 -0.0061 0.0186 -0.0086 
EDI income 4th quintile -0.0398 0.0064 0.0114 0.0423 0.0064 0.0492* -0.0252 -0.0341 -0.0359 
Constant 5.4508*** 5.2016*** 5.1144*** 4.4868*** 4.5393*** 4.5039*** 4.4267*** 4.3707*** 4.4607*** 
  Patients 14654 14213 14074 12060 11536 12218 11829 10000 8888 
Notes. Sample: CABG patients only. Controls: Age, age bands dummies, Charlson comorbidities dummies, Gender, Number of diagnosis, Emergency Past utilization previous year, hospital 
fixed effects. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
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Table 9: Quantile Regression with hospital fixed effects (Equation (9)). Income inequalities in waiting times. PCI patients.   
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
    2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Q10 
EDI income 1st quintile  0.5347*** 0.6444*** 0.4813*** 0.3905*** 0.4859*** 0.4600*** 0.2968*** 0.3182*** 0.3839*** 
EDI income 2nd quintile 0.4944*** 0.5205*** 0.4590*** 0.4294*** 0.4193*** 0.3107*** 0.2569*** 0.2808*** 0.3241*** 
EDI income 3rd quintile 0.3526*** 0.2711*** 0.2661*** 0.2765*** 0.3062*** 0.2480*** 0.2604*** 0.2150*** 0.2933*** 
EDI income 4th quintile 0.1697*** 0.1847*** 0.1071* 0.0948* 0.1548*** 0.1789*** 0.1513*** 0.1225** 0.1468*** 
Constant 2.2762*** 2.1458*** 2.6752*** 2.4491*** 2.3963*** 1.9818*** 2.1178*** 2.0808*** 2.0726*** 
Q25 
EDI income 1st quintile  0.5478*** 0.4538*** 0.3173*** 0.2200*** 0.2393*** 0.1999*** 0.1251*** 0.1640*** 0.1394*** 
EDI income 2nd quintile 0.4572*** 0.3758*** 0.2781*** 0.1969*** 0.2126*** 0.1406*** 0.1156*** 0.1771*** 0.1437*** 
EDI income 3rd quintile 0.2863*** 0.2468*** 0.1435*** 0.1612*** 0.1671*** 0.1349*** 0.1197*** 0.1322*** 0.1216*** 
EDI income 4th quintile 0.0950* 0.1418*** 0.1018*** 0.0475 0.0994*** 0.1159*** 0.0722*** 0.0731*** 0.0756*** 
Constant 3.1844*** 3.3229*** 3.5771*** 3.2415*** 3.2364*** 2.8132*** 2.8449*** 2.8313*** 2.8654*** 
Q50 
EDI income 1st quintile  0.4000*** 0.2463*** 0.1590*** 0.0902*** 0.0993*** 0.0637*** 0.0575*** 0.0667*** 0.0762*** 
EDI income 2nd quintile 0.3139*** 0.2306*** 0.1374*** 0.0882*** 0.0977*** 0.0580*** 0.0590*** 0.0527*** 0.0706*** 
EDI income 3rd quintile 0.1906*** 0.1495*** 0.0633*** 0.0762*** 0.0585*** 0.0616*** 0.0710*** 0.0507*** 0.0624*** 
EDI income 4th quintile 0.0580* 0.1045*** 0.0477** 0.0155 0.0382*** 0.0446*** 0.0367** 0.0239 0.0427*** 
Constant 4.0244*** 4.2324*** 4.1930*** 3.8407*** 3.7552*** 3.4175*** 3.3684*** 3.3757*** 3.3635*** 
Q75 
EDI income 1st quintile  0.2892*** 0.1276*** 0.0786*** 0.0560*** 0.0475*** 0.0433*** 0.0336** 0.0429*** 0.0331** 
EDI income 2nd quintile 0.2042*** 0.1341*** 0.0629*** 0.0592*** 0.0642*** 0.0433*** 0.0300** 0.0398*** 0.0444*** 
EDI income 3rd quintile 0.1620*** 0.0748*** 0.0238 0.0477*** 0.0346*** 0.0194 0.0302** 0.0313** 0.0353*** 
EDI income 4th quintile 0.0418 0.0504*** -0.0057 0.0095 0.0180 0.0181 0.0139 0.0192 0.0136 
Constant 4.6330*** 4.7744*** 4.6121*** 4.1564*** 4.1107*** 3.8019*** 3.7545*** 3.7348*** 3.7794*** 
Q90 
EDI income 1st quintile  0.2444*** 0.1234*** 0.0630*** 0.0330** 0.0417*** 0.0212 0.0190 0.0263 0.0100 
EDI income 2nd quintile 0.1551*** 0.0939*** 0.0611*** 0.0401*** 0.0645*** 0.0211 0.0277 0.0313* 0.0300 
EDI income 3rd quintile 0.1178*** 0.0352 0.0184 0.0106 0.0480*** -0.0083 0.0167 0.0252 0.0116 
EDI income 4th quintile 0.0346 0.0021 -0.0075 -0.0168 0.0272** -0.0109 0.0029 0.0107 -0.0163 
Constant 5.0896*** 5.1053*** 4.9312*** 4.3945*** 4.3773*** 4.1261*** 4.0557*** 4.0240*** 4.0714*** 
  Patients 16095 20140 24355 25632 26772 25545 25399 23861 23759 
Notes. Sample: PCI patients only. Controls: Age, age bands dummies, Charlson comorbidities dummies, Gender, Number of diagnosis, Emergency Past utilization previous year, hospital fixed 
effects. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
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6. Conclusions 
This study provides evidence of income-related inequalities in waiting times for cardiac 
revascularization procedures in the English NHS. Given our econometric framework with hospital 
fixed effects, the estimated inequalities can be interpreted as arising within hospitals rather than 
across hospitals. The quantitative effect tends to be large, with relative gaps between patients living 
in the most and least deprived fifths of small areas of 35% for CABG and 50% for PCI in 2002, falling 
to 10% and 15% respectively in 2011. The gap is also large compared to the gradient identified in 
other studies for non-life-threatening treatments such as hip replacement (Cooper et al., 2009, 
Laudicella et al., 2012). This suggests that inequalities in waiting times may be exacerbated when 
patients seek care for potentially life-threatening diseases. 
 
The analysis also shows that such socio-economic inequalities in waiting time cannot be explained by 
choice of hospital or treatment. Choice of hospital and treatment makes a statistically significant but 
relatively small contribution to socio-economic inequality in waiting times. Self-selection due to 
choice did not increase much after 2006 when the English NHS choice reforms were introduced. The 
level of pro-rich inequality in waiting time depends more on average waiting times than on the 
extent of patient choice. Inequalities reduced but did not disappear during a period of sustained 
expenditure growth in the English NHS in the 2000s. The substantial fall in pro-rich inequality began 
in 2002 when average waiting times started to fall, and had largely finished by 2006 when choice 
began to increase. Quantile regressions show that inequalities are pervasive and present both in low 
as well as high waiting time hospitals.  
 
Several mechanisms may explain the presence of a gradient in waiting times after controlling for 
ƐĞůĞĐƚŝŽŶ ĚƵĞ ƚŽ ƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ? ĐŚŽŝĐĞ ?One plausible mechanism is what we might call elbowing 
behaviour by less deprived patients. More socioeconomically advantaged patients are likely better 
endowed with information, networking skills, contacts and consciousness of their rights, enabling 
them to exercise more effective pressure to get prioritized for treatment. Moreover, the practice of 
defensive medicine by medical staff and hospital management may imply that richer patients are 
riskier to disappoint if the health of the patient deteriorates while waiting, since they (or their 
families) are more likely to promote legal actions for medical malpractice against the treating 
hospital. Finally, the phenomenon of unconscious bias can occur if doctors are better able to 
understand and interpret the health symptoms of patients who are closer to them in terms of 
socioeconomic status. Similarly, for unconscious psycho-social reasons they may under-estimate the 
need in socially disadvantaged patients.  Future research could explore in greater detail which of 
these mechanisms is at work.  
 
Our main insight for policy is that publicly-funded health systems are prone to substantial pro-rich 
inequalities in hospital waiting times, even in countries like England with well-funded and mature 
systems of universal health coverage.  We have shown that substantial socioeconomic inequalities 
can occur within the same hospital, for patients waiting for effective treatment for a serious heart 
condition, and that these inequalities are not primarily due to differences in patient choice of 
hospital or procedure.  Policy makers may see inequality in waiting time as a particularly concerning 
source of inequality in access to care, since waiting times appear to be directly under the control of 
healthcare providers. Policy makers in Europe and other countries have explicit policy goals to 
ensure equality of access based on need, not ability to pay, so inequalities of this kind are cause for 
concern and need to be addressed.  
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Appendix A: Chow F-test for switching regimes 
Table A 1: Chow F-test for switching regimes. 
CHOW test on Procedures (a) 
Years 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Chow F-stat value 34.557 19.704 14.357 14.584 16.588 27.703 27.063 12.416 11.108 
F-stat 90% C.L. 1.216 1.205 1.205 1.198 1.189 1.183 1.176 1.174 1.170 
F-stat 95% C.L. 1.285 1.270 1.270 1.261 1.249 1.240 1.231 1.229 1.223 
F-stat 99% C.L. 1.422 1.399 1.399 1.384 1.367 1.353 1.339 1.336 1.327 
CHOW test on Closest Hospital Bypassing - CABG sample (b) 
Years 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Chow F-stat value 3.432 2.339 2.326 1.278 1.756 1.668 1.466 1.385 1.197 
F-stat 90% C.L. 1.228 1.223 1.224 1.228 1.228 1.226 1.224 1.228 1.228 
F-stat 95% C.L. 1.301 1.294 1.297 1.301 1.301 1.299 1.297 1.302 1.302 
F-stat 99% C.L. 1.447 1.436 1.440 1.447 1.447 1.444 1.440 1.448 1.448 
CHOW test on Closest Hospital Bypassing - PCI sample (c) 
Years 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Chow F-stat value 3.237 3.776 2.754 3.252 2.403 3.115 2.457 2.545 1.703 
F-stat 90% C.L. 1.219 1.212 1.209 1.199 1.190 1.185 1.178 1.176 1.171 
F-stat 95% C.L. 1.290 1.280 1.276 1.262 1.251 1.243 1.235 1.231 1.224 
F-stat 99% C.L. 1.430 1.414 1.408 1.387 1.369 1.357 1.345 1.340 1.329 
 
In each year, the Chow F-test rejects the hypothesis of the conditional waiting times for the two 
revascularization procedures coming from the same data generating process at 99% confidence 
level. The test also rejects the hypothesis of conditional waiting times for each procedure coming 
from the exact same process for people treated or not at their closest hospital site, at 99% 
confidence level for PCI and at least 95% confidence level for CABG (excluding the last year of the 
sample). These results support the use of switching regression models as the correct empirical 
specification for our analysis. 
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Appendix B: Propensity score by self-selection status 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(a) CABG patients - Year 2002/03 - Hospital bypassing           (b) CABG patients - Year 2010/11 - Hospital bypassing       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(c) PCI patients - Year 2002/03 - Hospital bypassing                  (d) PCI patients - Year 2010/11 - Hospital bypassing 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
(e) All patients - Year 2002/03 - procedure choice                      (f) All patients - Year 2010/11 - procedure choice 
 
Figure B1: Propensity score by self-selection status 
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In Figure B1 we plot a graphical representation of the estimated parametric propensity score 
computed in financial years 2002/03 and 2010/11, based on the observable covariates included in 
the model. The top two graphs in Figure B1 show the propensity score frequency in the CABG 
sample based on the estimates of Eq. (3), the middle ones show the propensity score frequency in 
the PCI sample based on the estimates of Eq. (3) and the bottom ones the propensity score 
frequency in the pooled CABG ĂŶĚW/ƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ?ƐĂŵƉůĞďĂƐĞĚŽŶƚŚĞĞƐƚŝŵĂƚĞƐŽĨƋ ? ? ? ?   
 
The plots show the validity of the common support assumption in our models. If patients in the 
different selection regimes were so different to the point of not being comparable, then the plots in 
Figure B1 would show a complete lack of overlap of the frequencies of the estimated propensity 
score by bandwidth (vertical axis).  The overlap of the distributions instead is quite evident. The 
specification of the first stage probit seems to be adequately capturing the common underlying risk 
factors behind the self-selection choices and the estimated propensity score for the two treatment 
subgroups in each plots lies roughly in the same domain (horizontal axis). Hence, the sub-
populations of treated patients are still comparable and not too heterogeneous on their observable 
health risk profiles, when they are split by self-selection regime. 
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Appendix C: Self-selection model with joint choice of procedure and closest 
hospital bypassing 
In Table C 1 we show the results for a Roy model for the joint choice of selection into procedure and 
selection of bypassing the closest hospital. The selection correction is computed parametrically and 
based on the modification of the Dubin and McFadden (1984) multinomial logit selection correction 
proposed by Bourguignon et al. (2007). With this method, there are as many selection correction 
terms as the switching regimes, which are four in our case: two for the choice of closest hospital 
bypassing and two for choice of procedure. Both exclusion restrictions based on distance are used in 
the first step multinomial logit regression. 
 
Results. The estimation of the joint model for selection of hospital bypassing and procedure suggests 
very similar results to those in Table 5 and Table 6. A positive and strongly significant socio-economic 
gradient is found in each year for CABG patients choosing the closest hospital, as well as for both 
categories of PCI patients. The estimates of the gradient for CABG patients bypassing the closest 
hospital show a more erratic behaviour, and are significant for most but not all the years. It is not 
unlikely that in this case the estimation is fuzzier, as this is also the category with the smallest 
sample size. However, the results for the remaining three categories clearly show a strongly 
significant but decreasing socio-economic gradient in waiting time due to income deprivation. The 
estimated coefficients are larger and always significant in the most income deprived group, for both 
CABG and PCI patients choosing the closest hospitals. Hence, this confirms that most of the more 
income-deprived patients needing cardiac revascularization have been subject to waiting time 
inequalities due to SES in the English NHS between 2002 and 2010. 
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Table C 1: Generalized selection model with joint correction for choice of bypassing the closest hospital and procedure 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
CABG patients  ? bypassing the closest hospital 
EDI income 1st quintile 0.1299* 0.2387*** 0.2063*** 0.0622 0.1413*** 0.1615*** 0.0655 0.0795 0.0353 
EDI income 2nd quintile 0.0790 0.1950*** 0.0831* 0.0668* 0.1379*** 0.1755*** 0.0261 0.1040** 0.1417** 
EDI income 3rd quintile 0.0168 0.0845* 0.1577*** 0.0674 0.0673 0.1057*** 0.1113** 0.0703 0.0235 
EDI income 4th quintile -0.0239 0.0759 0.0348 0.0133 0.0092 0.1384*** 0.0815 0.0235 0.0467 
Selection correction 1 0.1435 -0.1877* -0.5304*** -0.1159 0.0304 -0.0157 -0.9992*** -0.1767 -0.1528 
Selection correction 2 1.4671** -0.2402 -1.6556*** -0.9507** -0.3961 0.0602 -1.3930*** -0.5345 -0.2145 
Selection correction 3 1.5134** 0.0629 -0.8693 -0.2172 -0.3878 -0.0589 1.4203** -0.3329 0.1872 
Selection correction 4 1.3843 0.4407 -0.6518 -0.0103 -0.0606 -0.1390 -0.7395 -0.7689 -1.2848** 
Constant 5.6196*** 4.3065*** 3.7506*** 3.5749*** 3.4398*** 3.5693*** 4.7056*** 3.1947*** 3.1095*** 
          
CABG patients  ? choosing the closest hospital 
EDI income 1st quintile 0.3231*** 0.2423*** 0.1447*** 0.1553*** 0.1559*** 0.1116*** 0.1216*** 0.0673** 0.0915** 
EDI income 2nd quintile 0.2398*** 0.1653*** 0.1143*** 0.1242*** 0.1524*** 0.1448*** 0.1099*** 0.0716** 0.0556 
EDI income 3rd quintile 0.1948*** 0.0994** 0.1401*** 0.1094*** 0.0894*** 0.0405 0.0789** 0.0040 0.0718** 
EDI income 4th quintile 0.0269 0.0683* 0.0763** 0.0746** 0.0435 0.0693** 0.0419 -0.0025 0.0290 
Selection correction 1 0.4425** -0.1876 0.2403 0.3175 -0.2225 -0.3966 0.0094 -0.2023 -0.0819 
Selection correction 2 0.2123 -0.3353* -0.2835 -0.1094 -0.2841* -0.2369** 0.3056* 0.0511 0.1948* 
Selection correction 3 0.9843** 0.5516 0.6292 0.3296 -0.0895 0.4122 -0.0133 -0.0504 -0.2675 
Selection correction 4 1.2962** 1.0995* 1.4148** 0.7802 0.2199 0.6098** -0.4410 -0.2979 -0.5977* 
Constant 4.8880*** 5.1171*** 5.2154*** 4.2758*** 4.0679*** 4.2878*** 3.1040*** 3.1771*** 2.8286*** 
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PCI patients  ? bypassing the closest hospital 
EDI income 1st quintile 0.3005*** 0.2947*** 0.1851*** 0.1409*** 0.1219*** 0.2022*** 0.1729*** 0.1434*** 0.1411*** 
EDI income 2nd quintile 0.2632*** 0.2754*** 0.1866*** 0.1502*** 0.1337*** 0.1551*** 0.1327*** 0.1631*** 0.1055*** 
EDI income 3rd quintile 0.1904*** 0.1731*** 0.0875** 0.1173*** 0.0938*** 0.1491*** 0.1468*** 0.1309*** 0.0780*** 
EDI income 4th quintile 0.0366 0.1146** -0.0051 0.0474 0.0633** 0.1074*** 0.0885*** 0.0990*** 0.0706** 
Selection correction 1 -0.4432 -1.7725** 0.7086 0.7006 -0.9006 0.8850 -1.6384*** -0.6523 -0.6232 
Selection correction 2 -1.4632 -1.0162 -0.6435 -0.0597 -1.2222** 0.4955 0.0408 -0.1519 0.1458 
Selection correction 3 0.1203 0.4246*** -0.1077 0.0043 -0.0671 -0.0993 0.1486** -0.2483*** -0.0698 
Selection correction 4 0.5363 1.4040** 0.1466 0.2880 -0.6262* -0.1983 -0.3049 -1.0517*** -0.3934 
Constant 3.0727*** 3.1742*** 4.0644*** 3.7554*** 2.8033*** 3.5259*** 2.6148*** 2.8115*** 3.0442*** 
          
PCI patients  ? choosing the closest hospital 
EDI income 1st quintile 0.3513*** 0.3094*** 0.2421*** 0.1750*** 0.1948*** 0.1462*** 0.0876*** 0.1052*** 0.1327*** 
EDI income 2nd quintile 0.2932*** 0.2199*** 0.1972*** 0.1600*** 0.1837*** 0.0923*** 0.0654*** 0.0943*** 0.1175*** 
EDI income 3rd quintile 0.2038*** 0.1413*** 0.1276*** 0.1155*** 0.1428*** 0.0436* 0.0789*** 0.0712*** 0.1030*** 
EDI income 4th quintile 0.1021** 0.1034*** 0.0769*** 0.0233 0.0711*** 0.0360 0.0423** 0.0329 0.0343 
Selection correction 1 -0.1947 -0.2666 -0.3714 -0.4835** -0.4667 -0.9468** -0.1649 -0.0197 -0.4650* 
Selection correction 2 -0.6268 -1.2616*** -1.3795*** -0.3843 0.1909 -0.6834* -0.8073** -0.4645 0.0988 
Selection correction 3 0.4207 0.4263 -0.1828 -0.1140 0.1630 0.4140** -0.1878 -0.3433** -0.3266** 
Selection correction 4 0.4816 0.4529** 0.0691 -0.1169 -0.1133 0.1804 -0.0244 -0.1742 -0.3293*** 
Constant 3.2925*** 3.1745*** 3.3433*** 3.4709*** 3.6752*** 2.8312*** 2.8950*** 3.0352*** 3.2928*** 
Notes. Roy model on joint cardiac revascularization procedures (CABG and PCI) sample based on multinomial logit selection correction. Exclusion restrictions in the 1
st
 stage regression: a) 
differential distance between second and first hospital site (by procedure); b) (average) distance between the first three hospitals providing CABG and the first three ones providing PCI. 
Controls: Age, age bands dummies, admission month, Charlson comorbidities dummies, Gender, Number of diagnosis, Emergency Past utilization previous year, hospital fixed effects (except 
for 1
st
 stage multinomial logit regression).    * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
